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The research environment 
 
The production of scientific knowledge is currently a broadly discussed topic. 
Not only because scientific knowledge is crucial for the development of science but 
also because of the emerging interest of society in scientific research. Researchers 
therefore try to find a balance between the future role of science and society in the 
production of knowledge.  
The production of scientific knowledge always requires a specific 
organisation. Such an organisation creates settings in which researchers can perform 
scientific research. These settings include e.g. a transparent system of sharing research 
results made public as scientific information. This organisation is formed by the 
research environment consisting of researchers justifying scientific information. 
The researcher claiming intellectual property strives for recognition and 
reputation in his research environment [Merton, 1957; Hagstrom, 1965, 1974] as well 
as other rewards resulting from it e.g. tenure [Altbach, 1996].  Scientific information, 
just like any information for an organisation, gives the researcher competitive 
advantage. The recognition increases the researcher’s power in competing for 
heterogeneously distributed strategic resources and thus in the researcher’s strategic 
positioning. This is because society is more likely to share strategic assets with 
recognised researchers, as they seem to be more credible and productive. 
Furthermore, the researcher having a high reputation is able to direct this society.  
Scientific information is thus an integral part of research. Scientific 
information is not a final product but an intermediary product accepted by the 
scientific community as being worthy of further scientific effort and scrutiny [Popper, 
1963]. Scientific information is not a goal in itself. The information produced in 
scientific research is being created in order to add value to existing scientific 
knowledge. This value, however, is only an added value if it’s shared. Sharing 
information is then in line with scientific ethos according to which science should be 
universal implying that nobody should be excluded from it. And scientific knowledge 
as a common property has to be shared otherwise it does not exist [Merton, 1973]. 
Therefore, the researcher being accountable to the research environment makes his 
research results public by means of a scientific publication. These results can then be 
falsified in future research [Popper, 1934]. 
As already mentioned before, scientific research is nowadays of interest not 
only for researchers but also for society, more specifically the societal environment. 
This societal environment plays one of the major roles in setting the research policy 
and research directions. By setting the research directions this environment has an 
impact on the scientific knowledge production.  
This impact has been studied e.g. by Knorr-Cetina [1981], Gibbons et al. 
[1994], Ziman [1994], Wilts  [2000], and Laudel [2006]. All claim that the production 
of knowledge is affected by a relationship between the researcher and his societal 
environment.  
A relationship established between the researcher being part of the research 
enterprise1 and his societal environment determines the creation of scientific 
knowledge in terms of choices the researcher has to make in research such as e.g. the 
choice of research goals, as well as in terms of sharing governance in a research 
                                                 
1
 The research enterprise is defined as either an individual researcher or a group of researchers 
performing activities contributing to scientific research. These activities include scientific activities as 
well as organisational activities embedded in the societal environment of such an enterprise. 
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project [Wilts, 2000]. Like in any relationship between organisations, a main 
parameter determining this relationship is the strategic positioning of the researcher in 
the societal environment. Like any organisation, the researcher positions himself in 
the strategic relationship in order to attain his long term, strategic goals. The overall 
strategic goal of any researcher is to contribute to scientific knowledge by scientific 
research. To perform research activities, the researcher makes strategic choices that 
lead to the strategic positioning of the researcher given his specific goals. The 
strategic choices of the researcher concern the directions of research as well as the 
acquisition of and matching of strategic resources offered by the societal environment. 
The strategic position that the researcher establishes to attain his strategic goals, is 
expressed in the relationship between the researcher and his environment. In this 
context the researcher, besides being an individual researcher can be an actor at 
different levels of aggregation: research at large, the research institute, the research 
group, the individual researcher.  
At present, two modes of such a relationship of researcher and his 
environment are known. These are the ‘ivory tower’ and ‘strategic research’, known 
also as mode1 and mode2 [Gibbons et al., 1994]. In this paper2, we present an 
analytical approach to these two well-known modes also leading to a new mode, 
mode 3 - the research entrepreneur. The research entrepreneur, compared to the 
researcher in mode2, is much more leveraging in the relationship with the societal 
environment. The research entrepreneur is directing the environment by creating 
demand for his scientific products instead of supplying on the demand of the 
environment. 
In this paper we will report on results from a study conducted in a research 
environment specifically selected for its high competitiveness, i.e. the fast developing 
domain of Nanoscience, more precisely, the case of the MESA+ Institute for 
Nanotechnology at the University of Twente.  
 
Strategic positioning of the researcher 
 
The strategic relationship between the researcher and his societal environment 
is being established with the goal to create added value. Such a strategic relationship 
can therefore be maintained if and only if the relationship results in the creation of 
added value. The partners decide to collaborate because without such a collaboration 
they would not be able to create added value. Establishing this strategic relationship is 
a process of negotiation between these two partners on sharing heterogeneously 
distributed strategic resources and on governing the directions of research. The 
researcher decides then to give up governing research to a certain degree and accepts 
sharing resources to a certain degree.  
These two negotiated aspects in the relationship known as organisational 
autonomy and strategic interdependence are used in strategic management research to 
analyse strategic alliances, joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions between business 
partners [Haspeslagh, Jemison, 1991]. As the strategic relationship is considered as an 
evolving process resulting in a deliberate and established collaboration, it is 
comparable with the abovementioned relationships. 
Strategic interdependence is defined as the deliberate sharing of 
heterogeneously distributed strategic resources (financial and human resources, 
                                                 
2
 The earlier version of this paper was presented at the 40th Anniversary SPRU conference in 
September 2006 [http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/events/ocs/index.php] 
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research facilities, and scientific knowledge) between the partners in order to achieve 
a joint strategic goal. Strategic interdependence is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for an effective collaboration, meaning that close collaboration goes hand in 
hand with a position of high strategic interdependence, and vice versa. 
Organisational autonomy is defined as self-governing in deciding about the 
directions of research in a competitive environment, including setting research goals, 
in which scientific knowledge is being created and scientific information is being 
used. A high position in organisational autonomy allows the researcher to make 
autonomous strategic decisions regarding setting goals and establishing how to attain 
these goals. A position of high strategic interdependence does not necessarily exclude 
a position of high organisational autonomy of the researcher. A strategic position is 
defined then as a combination of positions in organisational autonomy and strategic 
interdependence.  
Organisational autonomy is not so much about managing research but more 
about setting research goals. For instance, applicable products produced by the 
researcher are in principle not intentions of the researcher. In such a situation the 
researcher fits his own research goals to the societal environmental (whose intentions 
is to produce applicable scientific products) because he is driven by his strategic 
goals. 
Collaboration is defined as management of research, as organising activities 
leading to goal attainment. This being the case, collaboration integrates the goal of the 
strategic relationship: added value creation, strategic interdependence and 
organisational autonomy into a system. Collaboration of research includes managing 
financial, human resources and research facilities of the research enterprise as well as 
managing exchange of scientific knowledge between the partners.  
The strategic relationship between the researcher and the societal environment 
is seen in this paper as a social system [as proposed by Parsons, 1962, 1964]. This 
being the case, all the aspect of the relationship: added value creation, strategic 
interdependence, organisational autonomy and collaboration are functions performed 
by the partners in the relationship. These functions are interrelated with each other, 
while at the same time remaining distinct. We present the possible relations between 
these functions in the system as presented in the tetrahedron in Figure 1.  
 
 
Fig. 1 The strategic relationship of the researcher in the societal environment  
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The relations between the functions result in a number of combinations of 
modes of strategic positioning. We assume that only if strategic interdependence is 
aligned with collaboration, then research activities performed by the research 
enterprise will lead to added value. A position of high collaboration is aligned with a 
position of high strategic interdependence, and vice versa. Thus, a position of low 
strategic interdependence together with a position of high collaboration or vice versa 
is not possible, because if there is no exchange of strategic resources there is no need 
for managing them. 
From all possible combinations of relations between the functions, four 
combinations meet the above conditions. These combinations lead then to four 
possible modes of strategic positioning and can be formalised as: 
 
• ↑ AV = AV (C ↓ + OA ↓ + SI ↓)   mode0 
• ↑ AV = AV (C ↓ + OA ↑ + SI ↓)   mode1 
• ↑ AV = AV (C ↑ + OA ↓ + SI ↑)   mode2 
• ↑ AV = AV (C ↑ + OA ↑ + SI ↑)   mode3 
 
The model of strategic positioning analysing and justifying these modes of 
strategic positioning was presented in an earlier version of this paper [Kurek, Geurts, 
Roosendaal, 2006].  
Given these possible combinations of relations between the functions and 
degrees of these functions resulting in modes of strategic positioning we can order 
these modes due to the energy the researcher requires for the effort of creating added 
value efficiently. To analyse energy differences in a system consisted of the 
researcher and the societal environment we apply the term of the ‘ground state’ as 
used in atomic physics. 
 
 
Fig2. Ground state of strategic positioning 
 
The ground state is defined from the view of the researcher. The ground state 
requires the least energy from the researcher to create added value. This lowest state 
means that the researcher possesses a position of low collaboration and of low 
strategic interdependence and a position of high organisational autonomy. Hence, the 
researcher does not establish a relationship with the societal environment, which is 
not involved in creating added value. The ground state fits then the characteristics of 
mode1. 
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Any other position that requires more energy for creating added value is 
defined as an excited state. This means that the creation of added value in 
collaboration with the societal environment requires additional energy from the 
system of the two partners of collaboration. The acquisition of strategic resources has 
an impact on knowledge production by “consuming applicants’ and reviewers’ time 
and money, which would otherwise be available for research” [Knorr-Cetina, 1981; 
Chubin and Hackett, 1990; Lederman, 1993; Horrobin, 1996; Wessely, 1998; Laudel, 
2006]. This acquisition requires also extra energy as the researcher has to make an 
“effort in gathering information about the rules of the funding agency and ‘learning 
the game’” [Laudel, 2006]. Another example of extra energy required from the 
researcher is from the Framework Programmes of the European Union. The EU 
requires collaborative research projects only. The researcher therefore has to find 
research partners and manage such a collaborative research organisation [Eichinger, 
2007]. Furthermore, joint research projects require “negotiation, coordination and 
integration of heterogeneous types of knowledge, values and interests” [Maasen & 
Lieven, 2006]. This additional energy results from external restrictions on 
organisational autonomy that the researcher has to accept in the strategic relationship. 
The researcher will only invest in collaboration with the societal environment, will 
accept strategic interdependence to a certain degree, and will give up organisational 
autonomy to a certain degree, if this collaboration will result in added value. The 
societal environment is willing to invest in scientific research if this research creates 
added value for the environment. This added value is an objective for the environment 
and leads to external restrictions on research. Such an added value is then organised 
and commanded, and therefore requires extra energy from the researcher. The 
environment can also invest in research without this objective of added value. The 
added value is then used by others for further scrutiny and for adjusting to possible 
application. An example of such a situation is cosmology that is curiosity driven and 
has spin offs in application driven domains, e.g. nuclear instrumentation for medical 
applications.  
In the research reported here, the assumption is made that in any relationship 
the partners each strive in principle to maximise their organisational autonomy and to 
minimise their strategic interdependence. This means that any external restrictions 
from the societal environment on these dimensions, and finally on the added value are 
not desired. The long-term strategic goals of the researcher may, however, lead to a 
collaboration with the societal environment and allow the environment to limit his 
organisational autonomy leading to restrictions on added value. 
As said, the ground state mode1 is characterised by a position of low strategic 
interdependence and high organisational autonomy. This means that the researcher 
does not establish a relationship with the environment and therefore there are no 
restrictions on organisational autonomy. Therefore, the researcher does not need to 
take into account societal needs and demands when setting his research goals. He is 
independent and autonomous in taking strategic directions in research. In mode1 the 
added value is a curiosity driven scientific product, reliable knowledge [Ziman, 1991] 
as research goals are set by the researcher himself [Wilts, 2000] and it is being 
certified and accepted or rejected by the research environment. This, however, does 
not say anything about the quality of a scientific product. It means that such a product 
complies with scientific standards of the research environment and results of research 
are not necessarily meant to be of societal relevance. This type of strategic positioning 
is well-known as ‘ivory tower’ or ‘free research’ [Gibbons et al., 1994]. 
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By allowing the societal environment making restrictions, a scientific product 
is application driven [Wilts, 2000] as the environment has its own intentions 
concerning this product and the researcher allows the environment to persuade its 
intentions. Therefore, in mode0, mode2 and mode3 scientific products are more 
application driven, and socially robust [Novotny et al. 2001].  
The next mode that requires extra energy to create added value is mode3. 
Mode3 is characterised by a position of high strategic interdependence and of high 
organisational autonomy. We call this mode the research entrepreneur. In this mode 
the researcher allows the societal environment to make some restrictions on added 
value to an acceptable degree as the organisational autonomy remains high. The 
research entrepreneur has the opportunity to autonomously determine the strategic 
directions of research. He retains his own responsibilities for directing a project. The 
research entrepreneur is an answer to the need for a social contract rewarding all the 
parties, as proposed by Gibbons [1999]: the research entrepreneur interacts with the 
societal environment in such a way that “he speaks to the environment and the 
environment speaks back to him”. The two parties, the researcher and the societal 
environment are keen on establishing this strategic relationship. The researcher 
because his research will be funded, the societal environment because scientific 
results will be applied. The research entrepreneur, like a business entrepreneur, 
influences the societal environment by creating demand for his scientific products. 
The researcher entrepreneur influences added value by setting goals that determine 
scientific information acquired and used, and methodology used. 
The second excited state of strategic positioning is a position of low 
organisational autonomy and high strategic interdependence. In this mode2, the 
societal environment directs the researcher. It influences research directions taken by 
the researcher and ipso facto influences the added value the researcher creates. This 
means that the researcher matches his own research problems to existing research 
programmes based on the demand of the societal environment. Examples of this mode 
are consultancy and research outsourced by a financial partner if this partner demands 
particular studies to be carried out and the researcher complies. In this case, the 
researcher does not influence his societal environment in creating demand for his 
scientific products but supplies in reaction to the demand by the societal environment. 
The researcher listens to the environment and fulfils societal needs. By the societal 
need we mean a need, which is explicitly expressed by the strategic partner of the 
researcher, as a representative of the societal environment, in the strategic 
relationship. The properties of this mode show that this mode is comparable with 
Gibbons’ mode2 or strategic research as broadly described by him, his co-authors, and 
Ziman [Gibbons et al, 1994, Ziman, 1994]. 
In mode0 there is no strategic relationship between the researcher and the 
societal environment but a position in low organisational autonomy indicates 
restrictions on organisational autonomy. An example of such a mode is a researcher in 
the Middle Ages supported by a maecenas. This mode requires most energy to create 
added value. Nowadays researchers don’t accept this kind of positioning, therefore 
mode0 is rather irrelevant for this discussion. 
The researcher positions himself in a continuum of positions in between these 
four ideal types of modes of strategic positioning [Kurek, Geurts, Roosendaal, 2006].  
 
How to observe strategic positioning? 
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To observe the strategic positions we look at the exchange between the 
partners, the researcher and the societal environment, in the strategic relationship. The 
researcher making strategic choices is being influenced by other actors: the research 
environment and the societal environment3. By analysing the strategic relationship 
between the researcher and the environment we can actually measure how the 
strategic choices of the researcher are influenced by this environment. 
The researcher starts establishing a relationship with a strategic goal in mind 
that he strives to achieve. This goal is expressed in his intentions and situation. The 
researcher confronts then his intentions and situation with intentions and situation of 
the environment. The intentions, but not the strategic goal, are negotiable. The 
negotiation process ends with an agreement that is an expression of intentions and 
situations of the partners including potential positive and negative sanctions that could 
be used in case the partners deviate from situations and intentions they agreed upon. 
The agreement is then the enactment of the negotiation. The strategic choices the 
partners make afterwards are executed in terms of positive or negative sanctions 
included in such an agreement. The strategic choices of the researcher result in a 
position in organisational autonomy and strategic interdependence that he accepts in a 
specific relationship. We can then observe positions in organisational autonomy and 
strategic interdependence in potential sanctions on which the partners agreed. An 
analysis of contracts between research and environment will then result in a partial 
reconstruction of this negotiation process. 
Intentions of the researcher and the societal environment refer to scientific 
aspects of the research enterprise including strategic directions of research and 
management of research, the acquisition of scientific information, exchange of 
scientific information between the partners, and the dissemination of scientific 
information to the societal environment. The situation of the partner (the researcher or 
the societal environment) refers to all organisational aspects of a research project 
(mainly possession of strategic resources or lack of such resources).  
A strategic relationship between the researcher and his environment is in this 
research analysed in terms of four types of behaviour as proposed by Parsons [1963]. 
These types of behaviour are used by the partners to get the other to comply with their 
demands. 
 
 
 intention situation 
positive sanction persuasion (influence) inducement (money) 
negative sanction activation of commitments 
(commitment) 
deterrence (power) 
Table 1 Types of actor’s behaviour towards another actor and currencies of exchange 
[Parsons, 1963, p.44] 
 
 
 Table1 presents the types of behaviour and concomitant currencies of 
exchange4 (in brackets). To be able to compare different strategic relationships 
                                                 
3
 The societal environment is understood as users and potential users of scientific products and services 
who are interested in the development of scientific knowledge and relations between these users. In a 
strategic relationship that the researcher is involved in the societal environment consists of scientific 
communities financing research e.g. research group or institute, government and industry. 
4
 Parsons used to term “generalised media of exchange”. For reasons of consistency with the business 
literature we have chosen to use the term “currencies of exchange” consistently throughout this article.   
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established between the researcher and his societal environment we translate the types 
of behaviour of these partners to these currencies. A currency of deterrence is power. 
In a strategic relationship between the researcher and the environment, the 
environment has power to e.g. terminate a research contract (negative sanction) and 
therefore to affect the situation of the researcher. A currency for persuasion is 
influence. To influence others, actor uses his prestige, his reputation. The higher the 
reputation of the person, the easier to persuade others.  
 The researcher influences the societal environment when he offers (positive 
sanction) to create a new scientific product, e.g. a new theory that will supersede an 
existing one (effecting intentions of the users). When the partner in a relationship 
wants to induce the other he uses money. Money is not always ‘money’ in the literal 
sense; it can for instance be information or a physical product, which is being 
exchanged. It can be any scalable added value. Another way to get one partner to 
comply with demand is to commit him to the system of values and norms of the other 
partner. The researcher being a part of the research environment is committed to 
comply his research with high scientific standards, as discussed by Merton in his 
normative structure of science [Merton, 1973]. In a relationship with the environment, 
the researcher engages the environment to values and norms of the research 
environment, to a different extent in different relationships.  
 As the situation of the societal environment refers to organisational aspects of 
research including the control over strategic resources the researcher can hardly affect 
the situation of the general societal environment. The researcher can affect the 
situation of the societal environment differently at different levels of aggregation of 
this environment. One level is the level of industry. The researcher can affect a 
company e.g. by producing a scientific product from which the environment will 
financially benefit. The researcher can affect the situation of a company relatively 
more than the situation of another level of aggregation such as government funding 
agencies or the entire European community. The funding agencies or the EU can be 
affected only in the long term. This is because for a small-medium enterprise 
financing a research project is usually a bigger investment than for the European 
Union having larger research budget. Having invested in research, the situation of 
such an enterprise can depend on scientific product more than the situation of the EU. 
The next level of aggregation of the societal environment (the general level) 
considered in this research consists of potential buyers/users of scientific products. 
These potential users do not enter the strategic relationship and do not finance 
research. They can purchase scientific products. Such products will not affect their 
situation but can affect their intentions though. 
The societal environment using negative sanctions can change the situation of 
the researcher in a sense that he will have to look for another financial source. By a 
positive sanction the environment encourages the researcher to conduct certain 
research by means of rewards or strategic resources.  
 We will expand on the use of these currencies of exchange in the following 
paragraph. Observed examples of the use of currencies of exchange will be presented 
later when presenting empirical results. 
Some intentions of the partners are presented in the table1. This list is not 
definitive and will be expanded in the future. 
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 researcher societal environment 
added value • to deliver research results that will 
be reported and justified 
• to add to existing theories 
• to disseminate research results in 
o scientific publication 
o presentation 
o internal research reports 
• to independently choose a medium 
for dissemination of research results 
• to create a theory driven scientific 
product 
• to be recognised as an author of 
research results 
• to get research results 
delivered 
• to obtain new solutions 
(more cost effective, more 
efficient) to existing 
applications 
• to disseminate research 
results in 
o research reports 
o patents 
o business units 
• to direct a choice of medium 
in which results will be 
disseminated 
• to get an applicable 
scientific product created 
• to be recognised as a 
contributor to research 
strategic 
interdependence  
• to acquire strategic resources 
(financial, knowledge from the 
societal environment, research 
facilities, to acquire human 
resources without an involvement 
of the environment) 
• to share strategic resources 
(financial, knowledge with 
the researcher, research 
facilities if available, to be 
involved in acquisition of 
human resources) 
organisational 
autonomy 
• to set research goals  
• to direct research  
• to be accountable to the research 
environment only 
• to communicate research results 
primarily to the research 
environment  
• to govern scientific information use 
and acquisition 
• to govern methodology applied 
• to set research goals 
• to direct research 
• to ask the researcher to 
deliver on demand 
• to be informed on research 
results  
• to govern scientific 
information use 
• to govern methodology 
applied 
collaboration  • to organise research 
• to manage available human 
resources 
• to manage possessed financial 
resources  
• to manage research facilities 
• to manage exchange of scientific 
knowledge with the societal 
environment 
• to direct the organisation of 
research 
• to direct managing human 
resources 
• to direct managing financial 
resources 
• to direct managing research 
facilities 
• to direct managing exchange 
of scientific knowledge with 
the researcher 
Tab.2 Intentions of the researcher and the societal environment 
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The potential sanctions that the partners may use in the strategic relationship 
are specified in table3.  
 
 researcher societal environment 
Positive sanctions • offering added value 
o scientific product 
o scientific services 
o commercial product 
• offering strategic resources 
(human, knowledge, research 
facilities) 
• contribution of the societal 
environment will be mentioned in 
agreed media 
• offering added value 
o recognition 
o rewards 
o patents 
• offering strategic resources 
(human, financial, 
knowledge internalised by 
the societal environment, 
research facilities) 
• encouraging certain 
behaviour, e.g. 
dissemination of research 
results 
 
Negative sanctions • refuse to conduct specific 
research 
• refuse to produce demanded 
added value 
• refuse to disseminate research 
results 
• refuse to disseminate research 
results in a manner proposed/ 
medium chosen by the societal 
environment 
• disseminate research results 
without acceptance of the societal 
environment 
• terminate contract 
• refuse to conduct research if not 
universal 
• the researcher may acquire 
strategic resources from another 
representative of the societal 
environment in next research 
• disagreement 
• refuse to finance specific 
research 
• control of research and 
management activities 
• obstruction on 
disseminating research 
results 
• omit dissemination of 
research results 
• ask to delete certain 
information from a 
publication 
• terminate a contract 
• ask to conduct research 
compatible with ethical and 
political correctness   
• stop financing in future (if 
reputation is lost) 
• disagreement 
 
Tab.3 Potential sanctions by the researcher and the societal environment 
 
The observable difference between the modes of strategic positioning is in the 
balance of the sanctioning of intentions and situations. In balance, the partner 
sanctioning the other has a stronger flow of currency than the dependent partner. This 
asymmetry in the balance in the exchange of currencies is well visible in the excited 
states of strategic positioning.  
In the ground state (mode1) the researcher has a position of low strategic 
interdependence therefore there is no external exchange between the researcher and 
the societal environment. There is no direct flow of currencies of exchange between 
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these two partners; therefore there is no sanctioning from the environment. There is a 
symmetrical balance in exchange. The researcher has a position of high autonomy and 
there are no restrictions on organisational autonomy. This results in a theory driven 
scientific product as discussed before. In mode1 the research institute of the 
researcher and external institutions exchange money. These institutions do not 
directly connect money with research tasks and do not influence research directions 
(e.g. lump sum financing of universities). In such a situation, the researcher is 
accountable not to his societal environment but only to his research environment, 
meaning that he has to comply with the norms of the research environment. He has to 
create added value according to agreed standards without being constrained to 
specific, externally set research goals. Furthermore, it isn’t the intention of the 
researcher in mode1 to produce knowledge that can be applied directly and influence 
the societal environment. The researcher makes use of power and influence only 
within his research environment. In the mode1 situation, the researcher does not 
sanction the societal environment but only the research environment and vice versa. 
To get to the excited state the researcher allows the societal environment to 
sanction intentions (presented in table2) and situations having in mind the goal to 
create added value that he cannot create without strategic resources provided by the 
environment. The incentive for the researcher to move from the ground state is a long 
term strategic goal that he wants to achieve.  
In Mode3 the researcher is strong enough to sanction the societal environment. 
The most important characteristic of the research entrepreneur is that he influences 
research management and directions including research goals in such a way that he 
creates demand for scientific results he wants to deliver. The research entrepreneur 
influences the environment by creating demand for the scientific products he 
produces. Even being an equal partner in the collaboration the research entrepreneur 
is still accountable to the societal environment, but to a certain, negotiated degree. 
This degree depends on the degree of autonomy he accepts to give up reaching his 
strategic goals. Moreover, the exchanged commitment in the mode3 relationship is 
more general than in the mode2 relationship as it deals with more general issues such 
as e.g. ethical issues [van Steendam, et al. 2006] as will be seen below. Commitment 
is then not connected to specific research tasks and the researcher himself directs 
deliverables. This means that added value created by the researcher is negotiated by 
both partners but the societal environment does not govern this value. 
In mode2 added value creation is being restricted by the societal environment 
as the researcher possesses a position of low organisational autonomy and of high 
strategic interdependence. There is an exchange of currencies between the societal 
environment and the researcher. In such a relationship the environment sanctions the 
researcher. The researcher is accountable to the environment which is able to set 
specific research goals for the researcher. The societal environment will ask the 
researcher to deliver a specific commitment dedicated to a specific research task. This 
does not necessarily have to comply with high scientific standards, but must comply 
with the demand of the environment. Furthermore, next to setting research goals the 
environment influences the researcher and his research. The environment has also 
power in the mode2 relationship. 
 
Empirical study  
 
An analysis of the exchange between the researcher and his societal 
environment is being conducted at the MESA+ Institute for Nanotechnology being 
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part of the University of Twente (The Netherlands). MESA+ employs over 475 
people including 375 researchers. MESA+ is a multidisciplinary institute 
collaborating at the national and international level. Internationally MESA+ 
collaborates with e.g. IMEC (Belgium), Max Planck Institutes (Germany), 
Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe (Germany).  
The societal environment of MESA+ is represented by NWO (Dutch National 
Science Foundation), STW (Technology Foundation), Senter (an agency of the Dutch 
Ministry of Economic Affairs for implementing policies on: innovation, energy and 
climate and environment and spatial planning), FOM (Research foundation related to 
NWO), the European Commission (framework programmes), and industry.  
As mentioned before a strategic relationship is defined as a deliberate and 
established collaboration in which partners sanction each other, both positively and 
negatively, and are dependent on each other. These sanctions can be observed in 
formal documents such as contracts. Contracts are seen as expressions of desired 
intentions and desired situations. They in fact show the positions the involved partners 
want to establish with respect to each other and the needs of the partners that had to 
be resolved explicitly to establish the relationship. According to the model of strategic 
positioning, the observation of sanctions allows assessing the use of currencies of 
exchange and determining the mode of a strategic position. Therefore, a content 
analysis of contracts of research projects at MESA+ is carried out in this empirical 
study. Contracts are usually dealing in approximately 80% of their content with 
standard issues, but focusing on those non-standard 20% gives insight to what has 
been the core of the negotiation and therefore indicates the strategic positioning of the 
researcher in a strategic relationship. 
Studying research projects in this specific research environment consists of 
two steps: one step is contract analysis to be followed by the second step of 
interviewing researchers (not reported in this paper).  
The contracts were studied to analyse clauses indicating the presence of 
observables for added value creation, strategic interdependence, organisational 
autonomy, and collaboration. Each of these functions is operationalised in terms of 
intentions of the researcher and his societal environment as listed in table2. Each of 
these intentions (as well as the situation of the partners) is being matched with 
potential sanctions: positive and negative as proposed by one of the partners.  
To illustrate the model and the measurement some interesting aspects of 
content analysis of the contracts are presented underneath on one example of a 
strategic relationship of MESA+ and the European Union under the 6th Framework 
Programme. 
As expected, not all of the intentions from the list (table2) can be found in the 
contracts of MESA+. Nonetheless, in each contract there are at least a few, and this is 
sufficient to test the feasibility of the model in creating observables. 
Each mode of strategic positioning has a specific combination of strategic 
interdependence, organisational autonomy and collaboration being variables 
determining the added value creation (being in this model a dependent variable). In 
the different modes the researcher has to accept different restrictions from his societal 
environment on these variables in order to create added value. This being the case, 
each of these four variables will be analysed closely and separately to distinguish 
between these restrictions. 
In the exemplary contract between MESA+ and the EU it is expressed that 
MESA+ responds to a call for proposals with a new solution to existing applications, 
which up till now are not sufficient in terms of cost effectiveness and efficiency. This 
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agreement is interpreted as a positive sanction affecting the intentions of the 
environment. Therefore it indicates the use of influence by the researcher. This 
statement also indicates that added value will be created in this relationship. 
Furthermore, the researcher offers the environment “to maintain such higher level 
competitiveness” (positive sanction) of European research and this will affect the 
intention of the societal environment who wants to be competitive.  
MESA+ affects intentions of the societal environment by proposing this 
specific solution, and can sanction negatively the environment (can refuse doing 
specific research) if the environment does not agree and tries to affect and change this 
solution. This indicates the exchange of commitment by the researcher for money that 
the EU agrees to invest in the proposed solution (positive sanction affecting the 
situation of MESA+). The commitment is more general as it is MESA+ who decides 
what solution to produce and the environment agrees on what the researcher proposes. 
MESA+ offers to “bridge the gap from ‘knowledge production’ to ‘knowledge use’” 
(positive sanction) affecting intentions of the societal environment (indicating an 
exchange of influence by the researcher). This argument also indicates that the 
environment affects the intention of the researcher. The researcher has to comply with 
the restriction of the environment and deliver added value that can be applied 
otherwise the environment will not grant the project (potential negative sanction 
affecting the intention of the researcher indicating an exchange of commitment by the 
EU).  
Research results will be disseminated via scientific publications as well as via 
the web site, the popular scientific press, and via invited European companies “to lay 
the foundations of a European network of companies and research institutes that 
develop, fabricate or apply …(scientific product at hand)” (positive sanction affecting 
the intentions of the societal environment indicate exchange of influence by the 
researcher). Furthermore, the environment requires that “any notice or publication by 
the contractors about the project, including at a conference or seminar, must specify 
that the project has received research funding from the Community’s Sixth 
Framework Programme” otherwise the research project will not be funded (potential 
negative sanction affecting the situation of the researcher indicating use of power by 
the EU). The researcher will be recognised as an author as he can use his research 
results “the contractors shall use or cause to be used the knowledge arising from the 
project, which they own, in accordance with their interests” (negative sanction that 
can be used if the environment would not agree, affecting the environment’s 
intention). However, “the contractors shall set out the terms of use in a detailed and 
verifiable manner, notably in the plan for using and disseminating the knowledge, and 
in accordance with the provisions of this contract and the Rules for Participation” 
(potential negative sanction affecting the intention of the researcher).  
The next variable determining the added value creation is strategic 
interdependence. As expressed in the contract, both partners share strategic resources 
with each other. MESA+ shares “experience, infrastructure and know-how” and “the 
consortium partners possess between them the wide range of skills and relevant 
infrastructure” (positive sanction affecting the intentions of the societal environment) 
whereas his environment shares financial resources (positive sanction affecting the 
situation of the researcher). Another indicator of strategic interdependence is the 
acquisition of human resources by the researcher (positive sanction affecting the 
intention of the societal environment). 
As we assume in the model, the researcher strives to maximise his 
organisational autonomy. The researcher if accountable to his societal environment, 
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like in this case, has always to provide arguments for his choices in setting research 
goals and in a choice of research methods.  
A deficiency in this method is that we cannot observe the research interests of 
the researcher and to what extend he has to fit his research interests to research topics 
proposed by the societal environment. This deficiency will be solved by expanding 
this study to include interviews and scientific publications analysis (publication 
records will help to define research interests of researchers involved in analysed 
research projects). As this is a large project requiring extra energy to create added 
value we assume in this example that, the researcher looks for a call for proposal that 
will fit his research interests as close as possible. Hence, he sets a research goal more 
autonomously. 
MESA+ in this relationship defines the methodology that will be applied: “the 
overall methodology has the advantage of inherently minimising the risk of project 
failure” (positive sanction affecting the intention of the societal environment). The 
EU sets some restrictions on the methodology in the sense that the researcher tries to 
prevent a project failure (negative sanction; intentions). But after all, it is the 
researcher who directs methodology and the direction of research (potential negative 
sanction potentially affecting the intentions of the EU and indicating the use of 
commitment by MESA+).  
As mentioned, MESA+ is accountable to the EU as the EU requires reports on 
the progress of the research otherwise the researcher can lose his reputation and this 
can change the organisational aspects of research (potential negative sanction 
affecting the situation of the researcher and indicating the use of power by the EU): 
“the project co-ordinator MESA+ will organise an annual assessment meeting (…) 
with all parties and the Commission’s representative(s)”, and “final versions will be 
proved before the end of each year for the assessment review by the European 
Commission”. 
The last, but not the least, function of strategic positioning is collaboration. 
Activities that the partners perform focus on the organisation and management of the 
research. According to the contract, the researcher manages and organises the 
research activities (positive sanction affecting the intentions of the societal 
environment; and potentially a negative sanction if the researcher refuses to conduct 
this research thereby affecting the intentions of the societal environment). The project 
coordinator is chosen by the researcher and named in the contract (potential negative 
sanction, as mentioned above, affecting the intentions) but the EU has to agree to this 
coordinator (negative sanction potentially changing the situation of the researcher). 
The EU requires a specific project management that is standard for all the applicants 
(negative sanction potentially affecting the situation of MESA+). The researcher has 
to establish an international collaboration before applying for the resources. Project 
proposals without other research partners are not taken into account by the EU 
(potential negative sanction affecting the intentions of the researcher as well as his 
situation). This somewhat limits the researcher striving for independence in research.  
This presented analysis shows that the contract covers almost all of the 
intentions of both partners. Some of the intentions are not included in the contract 
indicating that the exchange of currencies has not reached the equilibrium for each of 
the variables (table3). This needs further exploration in future research. 
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 researcher societal environment 
added value • influence 
• general commitment 
• commitment 
• power 
• money 
• commitment 
strategic 
interdependence  
• influence • money 
organisational 
autonomy 
• influence 
• commitment 
• power 
• commitment 
collaboration  • influence  
• commitment 
• power 
• influence 
Tab.4 The strategic positioning of the researcher as expressed in the exchange of currencies∞  
 
The balance in exchange of currencies in this contract is asymmetrical as 
presented in table4. This means that this project requires from MESA+ extra effort to 
create added value. The balance shows that there is a stronger flow of influence and 
commitment (general commitment for added value) for MESA+. The flow of power 
and money is stronger for the EU. A flow of influence in collaboration from and to 
both partners indicates a relationship of two strong partners and the engagement of the 
EU in the organisation and management of this research project. 
As the model of strategic positioning is a continuum, the researcher can be 
more a research entrepreneur in some aspects of strategic positioning e.g. in added 
value creation whereas in the other aspects e.g. in organisational autonomy, 
collaboration he can be less entrepreneurial. 
As said, the modes of strategic positioning have specific combinations as 
results of the model of strategic positioning. Having elaborated the functions of the 
model it can be concluded that MESA+ has a position of high strategic 
interdependence (observed stronger flow of influence by the researcher) and high 
collaboration (observed flow of influence on both parties), and a position of quite high 
organisational autonomy (not as in the ideal type) in the strategic relationship with the 
EU. This combination is therefore close to the ideal combination indicating the mode3 
of strategic positioning. 
 
↑ AV = AV (C ↑ + OA ↑ + SI ↑)   mode3 
 
In this particular contract MESA+ is positioned slightly above mode3 (see 
Figure 3) on the scheme of energy required from the researcher to create added value. 
The energy required from the researcher is much lower than in mode2 but somewhat 
higher than in mode3. 
 
 
                                                 
∞
 The exchange between MESA+ and the EU (STRP 01303) 
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Fig.3 A particular strategic position of MESA+ in its relation with the EU  
 
A similar analysis was done for other contracts of MESA+. An example of a 
strategic relationship with a company shows that there is also an asymmetrical 
balance of power, money and commitment for the company. The position of MESA+ 
is not very high in organisational autonomy and collaboration. We can conclude that 
this particular relationship is more mode2 than mode3. 
 
Outlook and conclusions 
 
In this paper, the concept of strategic positioning is being applied to the 
relationship between researcher and environment. Based on this concept, a new, 
analytical model of this relationship of the researcher is developed. The model is built 
on the assumption that the researcher has long-term goals and in order to achieve 
these goals he strategically positions himself and his research in his societal 
environment. The second assumption is that he establishes a relationship with this 
environment, with the goal to create added value, when positioning, and such a 
relationship is comparable to relationships as strategic alliances, joint ventures, 
mergers and acquisitions. This model then results in different modes of strategic 
positioning. These modes depend on the researcher’s strategic choices and on his 
long-term strategic goals. The model is able to deal with the researcher at different 
levels of aggregation ranging from the individual researcher to the research institute 
or research at large. 
With this model the modes well known from the literature, mode1 – ivory 
tower and mode2 – strategic research, and a new mode3 – the researcher entrepreneur 
can be measured. The research entrepreneur, as distinct from the other modes, is 
highly autonomous and at the same time fully intertwined with his environment. 
The model is able to measure the positions in organisational autonomy and 
strategic interdependence that the researcher most probably is likely to accept given 
his strategic goals. Therefore, it is able to measure the mode of strategic positioning 
the researcher decides to establish, under the assumption that the researcher behaves 
like a rational actor and given ceteris paribus conditions. 
These modes of strategic positioning are being analysed in terms of energy 
that is required from the researcher to create added value. The term “ground state” is 
used here to analyse the creation of added value that requires different degrees of 
energy from the researcher for different modes. Creation of added value in 
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collaboration with the societal environment requires always more effort because the 
environment wants to influence research with his own intentions. 
Energy differences have consequences for scientific products. More curiosity 
driven scientific products (reliable knowledge, as defined by Ziman, [1991]) require 
less energy to create and tend to be like in mode1. Scientific products in mode2 
require more energy to create. This is because in mode2 (more than in mode3) the 
researcher is accountable to the societal environment, is driven by the intentions of 
this environment in this way accepting restrictions on research. The mode2 scientific 
products are mostly intended to be application driven (socially robust as defined 
Novotny et al., [2000]). The mode3 researcher, as he influences his societal 
environment, accepts fewer restrictions from the environment and therefore fewer 
intentions of this environment. The mode3 scientific product can be application driven 
as well, if agreed. 
Different research organisations and scientific domains are characterised by 
different distributions of modes of strategic positioning, and are necessarily 
commensurate with the added value intended by these organisations and domains.  
For example, theoretical physics, mathematics and cosmology will position 
themselves more like the mode1 researcher whereas nanotechnology, applied 
mathematics etc. more like the mode2 or mode3 researcher.  
The research entrepreneur is claimed to be the answer to the need, as 
articulated by Gibbons, for a new social contract between research and the societal 
environment requiring research to “enter the agora and participate fully in the 
production of socially robust knowledge” [1999]. To paraphrase Gibbons [1999], the 
research entrepreneur speaks to the societal environment and this environment not 
only speaks back but also listens to the researcher as he directs the environment. 
The results from this preliminary study conducted at the MESA+ Institute for 
Nanotechnology show that the researcher establishes in his negotiations different 
strategic positions in different relationships with different partners. The position 
depends on the strategic long-term goals of the partners that make the researcher to 
give up the governance of research and to accept sharing strategic resources. In its 
relationship with the EU MESA+ positions itself more as the research entrepreneur. 
This is an example of a relationship of two strong partners who are strategically 
interdependent on each other resulting in a joint goal and an exchange of resources to 
attain this goal, and at the same time, the researcher is autonomous enough to 
influence the societal environment and the EU as its representative. This relationship 
is typical mode3. In its relationship with a company MESA+ positions itself more as 
the strategic researcher.  MESA+ can thus be dependent on a partner such as a 
company who wants the researcher to deliver a solution to a set of certain research 
goals only. This relationship is a typical mode2 relationship. 
The empirical findings confirm the feasibility of the proposed analytical 
model; the model is feasible as it is able to create observables for the different modes 
of strategic positioning of the researcher. Further research focused on predicting the 
performance of research tasks e.g. acquisition of scientific information by the 
researcher as determined by strategic positioning will be reported in the future. 
The researcher will in the long term strive to achieve a position of highest 
possible organisational autonomy and lowest possible strategic interdependence. 
Along the path to achieve this desired strategic position, the researcher may encounter 
the need to compromise on strategic positioning in mode2 or in mode3. Nevertheless, 
at the end of the day mode2 and mode3 will only be intermediate positions necessary 
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to attain the desired mode1 strategic position. This is the position of the least energy 
required for added value creation, the “ground state”. 
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